A WAR OF CHOICE

Richard N Haas, President, Council on Foreign Relations offered the following distinction between a “war of necessity” and a “war of choice.” The former are unavoidable, involve critical national interests, there are no alternatives to the use of main force, and a certain and considerable price would be paid as a consequence of inaction. The Second World War is the prime example. The War of Choice, on the other hand, tends to involve less vital interests and viable alternative policies are available, be they diplomacy, inaction, or other sanctions.

Haas acknowledged that subjectivity was unavoidable in such characterizations. However, the key point is that his distinction is not one between wars that are judged to have been 'good' and wars that are judged to have been 'bad' or between those seen as 'successes' and those seen as 'failures'. In short the retrospective assessment as to whether a war was worth fighting or well fought has no bearing on what kind of war it was. Our verdict of policies is inevitably shaped retrospectively on the outcomes and the balance between results and costs. However, hindsight should not be required to understand what was done and why. This does not of course matter when it comes to wars of necessity as, by definition, such wars must be fought. Wars of Choice, on the other hand, place full responsibility on decision-makers due to the considerable human, military, and economic costs associated with armed conflict. Such decisions should be made in the light of a rigorous public assessment of the likely costs and benefits of action and the possibility that other policies might be implemented. Wars of Choice are not then eliminated but it should be better understood that they must be the exception, not the rule, to ensure that there is adequate will and ability to fight Wars of Necessity when they materialize.

In a retrospective assessment of the Falklands conflict of 1982 it was noted by The Spectator (31 March 2012) that it coloured domestic politics in changing attitudes to foreign policy and war itself. Much debate has concerned its contribution to the re-election of Thatcher and her Conservative government in 1993. A more general point to be considered is the opportunity the Falklands ‘victory’ afforded her successors. That was in signalling the apparent reversal of Britain's steady international decline since the Suez debacle of 1956. Through the 1970's, Europe aside, Britain's politicians were primarily preoccupied with the domestic challenges of industrial decline and unrest; economic recession and an IMF bail-out. And, lest we forget, the war on domestic terrorism emanating from Ulster which is still euphemistically referred to as ‘The Troubles’. The Falklands reinstated foreign affairs as a measure of successful leadership and that has remained the case ever since.

 “Everywhere I went after the war,” Thatcher wrote in her memoirs, “Britain's name meant something more than it had.”. 

Whereas America's costly defeat in Vietnam had made war seem messy and unpredictable. Thatcher's apparent victory in the Falklands reinstated the notion that war could achieve political ends quickly and efficiently. The fatalistic anti-militarism that had prevailed in Westminster was replaced with the refrain that Britain's noble and professional armed forces were the “best in the world”.

From its contribution to the static defence of Europe from the Soviet Union through the Cold War Britain's appetite for active conflict was reinstated. Consciously or otherwise, Thatcher’s triumphalism informed Britain’s subsequent engagement in a series of military interventions. From the short, sharp excursions of the first Gulf war, Kosovo, Sierra Leone etc. the ‘successful’ run of expeditionary wars ended in Afghanistan and Iraq. The constantly changing rationales offered for fighting indeterminate and elusive enemies yielded inevitably disappointingly political results. In consequence the Falklands war- a swift victory over another nation state for a simple cause —is now regarded with almost as much pride and nostalgia in Britain as the 1966 World Cup.

Opinion polls suggest that the British public remain firmly opposed to any concession on the governance of the islands and that any compromise with Argentina would be impossible while the war is a living memory. Leaving aside the direct cost of that ‘victory’ the British Government’s commitment to the Falkland islanders' right of self-determination, including the garrison and air and sea links to Britain, is currently estimated at £200m a year. That it be viewed retrospectively as a War of Necessity and its ongoing defence generally accepted and supported as a matter of  choice by the wider public can be attributed, in part, to that  war's lasting emotional impact.

For the current generation of Britain's leaders, who mostly reached (what passes for) political consciousness in the early 1980s, that conflict left its mark. The Tory party (and it would appear many Labour politicians) revere Thatcher. This week’s vote in favour of military intervention in Syria was resoundingly presented by its supporters as a matter of necessity. It has ever been thus. However, by virtue of the level of public opposition and open debate, it may be more correctly seen to be one of choice. The disparity between the Parliamentary vote and public opinion suggests the, albeit cynical, conclusion that the engagement is all about retaining some of Thatcher’s swagger in the international community. 

In making that commitment those that voted favour should be reminded that they are not buying Britain a place at the big table- we are merely renting a chair indefinitely.

In that respect British foreign policy merely clings to the tatters of its former imperial glory. A lot of innocent people get killed to allow a few third rate people to travel first class.