WOLF HWYL

The current preoccupation of the BBC with all things Tudor prompts the following account of Cardiff in that period. Whereas in many accounts of the modern city year Zero is 1814 and the ascendancy of the Second Marquess of Bute to the lordship of Cardiff Castle that title, and control of the related lands, may be traced back directly to the later Tudor period. That landholding originated in Royal gift in the C16th and the direct succession of title of the estates of the Lordship of Cardiff from 1547 – 1947 provided the foundation for the exponential development through the C19th which, in turn, secured for what had been a small mediaeval settlement the eventual status of city, capital and seat of government in the C20th.

This earlier history is every bit as colourful as the period of its origin. The source of the Bute family interests may be seen to originate in the grant of lands by Edward VI to William Herbert in 1547, the title passing by inheritance and marriage to the Bute family in 1766. The grant of land and titles to William Herbert between 1547 and 1549 was in reward for his services to the Crown which included the suppression of a rising in favour of the old religion in the West Country. In the course of that campaign it was estimated that some 10,000 peasantry and yeomanry were slain (Thompson 1930 p110).

Herbert ( c. 1501 - 1570 ), was the eldest son of Sir Richard Herbert (‘ Ddu ’) of Ewyas , bastard of William Herbert (d. 1469 ), earl of Pembroke of the first creation.  Described as a "mad fighting fellow," the young Herbert was noted for his intense ambition, fierce temper and hot-headed nature. He left his early employment as a gentleman servant to the earl of Worcester when he fled to France to avoid arrest for killing a city sheriff in Bristol. He joined the service of the French King Francis I, as a soldier earning royal favour for his martial skills and a recommendation to the service of Henry VIII  who much valued him, and heaped favours and honours upon him.

Herbert's first wife, Anne Parr, was sister to Catherinr Parr, sixth wife to King Henry VIII from 1543. He rose with the Parrs after his sister-in-law's marriage and from 1545 and 1546 acquiring in course the lordships of Miskin, Glynrhondda, Llantrisant, Neath Ultra and Neath Citra, the manor and Borough of Neath and the town of Briton Ferry. He was created Baron Herbert of Cardiff  and earl of Pembroke in 1551 and accumulated other lands and offices in South Wales , including the lordships of Usk , Trelleck , and Caerleon. As an executor of Henry VIII 's will, he became a governor to the young King Edward VI , one of his privy councillors and a Knight of the Garter.

After the death of Edward VI, Herbert initially supported (some would say initiated) the plot to crown lady Jane Grey of 1553 having married his eldest son and heir, Henry to her sister, Lady Catherine Grey. When it became clear that Mary Tudor would take the throne as Mary I Herbert cast his daughter-in-law out of the house and had the marriage annulled. Lady Jane and her father were subsequently executed for high treason in 1554 and, having distanced himself from the Grey family after their fall, Herbert secured the new queen's favour by crushing Thomas Wyatt's rebellion and commanding her army in France in the campaign of 1557.  

He remained in favour under Elizabeth , who made him ‘ custosrotulorum ’ of Glamorgan in 1567 and lord steward of her household in 1568 . He further increased his estates by purchasing the Llantarnam monastic lands but finally lost favour through his support of the proposed marriage of the duke of Norfolk to Mary , Queen of Scots. He died on 17 March 1570 , and was buried in S. Paul's.

It must be noted that this William, Earl of Pembroke had a brother, Sir George Herbert, who inherited the Craddock Estates in Swansea from his mother and, following the dissolution of the monasteries, acquired the Grey Friars property in Cardiff. When he purchased the friary lands he also purchased land in Llanishen, Llysfaen, and Roath. This may have been an opportunistic acquisition and not necessarily a royal gift. Sir George Herbert was, however, ‘granted’ Tewkesbury and Margam by the King and also land at Cogan, near Cardiff, where he built a house and the adjoining lands at Llandough. His son built a mansion at Cogan Pill and his grandsons were Sir William Herbert of the Friars, John who was secretary to both Elizabeth I and James I, and Nicholas who was MP for Cardiff 1584-5.

As Sir George Herbert had a son and grandson both called William and it is important to make a clear distinction between the two family lines. The Pembroke line holds Cardiff castle and the estates in Glamorgan which eventually pass to the Bute family by succession and marriage. That line has a significant role to play in the patronage of art and architecture in Britain, less so of that in Cardiff directly. To clearly differentiate reference will be made to Sir William, grandson of Sir George Herbert, as Herbert of the Friars. He inherited the Grey Friars monastery adjacent to the castle and used its materials to construct a mansion which he called ‘The Friars’ which that branch of the family occupied until circa 1730.

"By the late 16th Century, Cardiff’s finest house graced the land where once the Greyfriars stood. The grand stone Tudor mansion complete with bays and fine windows, became known variously over the years as the Friars, Whitefriars, or Herbert House. This was the home of Sir William Herbert (1548-1610). However, in contrast to the grace and beauty of his house, he appears to have been a rogue of the first order!"

Sir William Herbert of The Friars and his brother Nicholas were, by the colourful account of Herbert Thompson, of a belligerent and quarrelsome nature  (Thompson 1930 pp111-113). In 1576 he had to appear before the Council in the Marches in connexion with a brawl between his servants and those of inveterate foes William Bassett I of Beaupré and William Carnein which a constable was ‘grievously hurt’. In the same year an appeal was made to him as a piracy commissioner to rescue a foreign victim of pirates under the protection of his powerful kinsman, Sir John Perrot, but he declined to intervene. Tudor Cardiff was rife with piracy and goods plundered from the shipping routes to and from Bristol were  landed into South Wales, especially Penarth and Cardiff.

Herbert of the Friars was variously a Knight, a Justice of the Peace, and served as Sheriff of Glamorgan but far from upholding law and order, he exploited his position ruthlessly, and made significant personal gains through collaborating with pirates and shielding them from justice. One of the most notorious of them, John Callice was even a guest of Herbert’s in his mansion at the time of one investigation. The successive  investigations by the Admiralty and the Privy Council were hampered by Herbert intimidation of the local populace and he and other prominent South Wales citizens, were simply fined and bound over for their dealings. In addition to those authorities concerned with suppressing piracy Herbert of the Friars also troubled those concerned with other aspects of law and order. Actions were brought against him in the Star Chamber alleging that he had contravened crown grants by disposing of property while he was Sherriff of Glamorgan. He was again called to the Star Chamber concerning  a dispute between borough and county over the building of Cardiff bridge in 1577-87, and in 1596 when the bailiffs of the town sued on charges of rescuing his servants from Cardiff gaol, procuring by intimidation a partial coroner’s verdict on a townsman who was killed, and threatening to have the borough charter annulled. Herbert was back the following year for another Star Chamber action, accused of using ' 400 of the posse comitatus to overawe the town and to rescue a kinsman, leaving the bailiffs helpless, the town in an uproar, and peaceful citizens afraid to stir abroad. In the end, he was fined 1,000 marks, but he retained his seat on the council in the marches'.

Some will just remember the remains of The Friary which remained a Cardiff landmark until the late 1960s, when it was shamefully demolished and replaced by the Pearl Building, more latterly known as capital Tower. Others might conclude that this is perhaps a more fitting memorial to the lawless and corrupt Herbert than that in St John's Church, Cardiff.

Further references; 

 Thompson, H. M. (1930). Cardiff. Cardiff, William Lewis.

- See more on Tudor Cardiff at the excellent : http://www.thepennypost.co.uk/2011/05/08/cardiff-history-the-forgotten-rogue-of-tudor-cardiff/#sthash.C9zMFsgU.dpuf

on William Herbert at

http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1558-1603/member/herbert-william-i-1539-1609

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NECESSITY IS THE MOTHER OF INTERVENTION

The recent criticism of commercial property acquisition by the National Assembly for Wales appears to have revived a very old issue or, more correctly, issues. The first is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to defend such action as strategic intervention in the absence of any apparent strategy. Were this an official and widely applied strategy then it would signal a significant reversal of Assembly policy to that which has prevailed. That was, of course, informed by a view that questioned the efficacy of public sector intervention in property markets. It favoured ‘investment in people not places’ and abandoned what Reinhold Niebuhr dismissed as ‘salvation by bricks’. In short, the prevailing wisdom which saw the abolition of the Welsh Development Agency, the Land Authority for Wales, the winding-up of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation and other agencies of intervention in regional property markets.

There is, in my view, a case to be made for some clear policy on public sector intervention and that issue is considered further below. I will first briefly address any defence of opportunistic or reactive property acquisition as may be offered. Under certain circumstances public sector intervention may be essential to prevent the wider economic impact of catastrophic failure in the commercial property sector. Such measures were deployed following the Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973 and were central to Government and Bank of England intervention which ensured the controlled disposal of property to arrest the rapid deflation of property values. In subsequent recessions fiscal and other measures have been deployed to mitigate market failure. Such action may be inevitable periodically as, in the view of some, too great a proportion of the UK economy is vested in landed property which is, by its nature, a notoriously imperfect market. An aspect of that imperfection may be illustrated in the simplest of terms by reference to the fundamental economic principles of supply and demand. Overall demand for property can change very quickly, supply cannot. Coupled with this are further factors such as transactional speed and cost and other considerations. Stated simply, property is a long-term business and those that participate in it with a short term view are inevitably at greater risk.

I have no knowledge of any recent cataclysmic failure in the local property market which might have precipitated public sector investment with the attendant risk concomitant upon the Welsh Assembly acquisitions at issue. Given the historic and persistent antipathy to financial support for projects in the capital from elsewhere in Wales it is perhaps unsurprising that the opponents of the current administration would take the opportunity to denounce such initiatives. Perceptions that central Cardiff enjoys relative prosperity compared to less advantaged parts of the region have been, and evidently remain, a persistent factor in the standing debate on the allocation of financial resources. This would inevitably call to question a speculative property investment by the Assembly in Cardiff Bay, where £2.4 billion was invested and, even more specifically, at Callaghan Square which was created as part of a PFI project which will cost the public sector circa £190m. In the latter case the State sponsored project was undermined by competing speculative development which syphoned off occupational demand for commercial development. In that instance it may be claimed that the private sector were very much smarter and lighter on their feet than those in the public sector. The converse argument is that those entrepreneurs produced low quality buildings and, consequently, low value jobs and, if Cardiff is to be the locomotive of regional economic growth, intervention remains necessary to achieve better quality commercial accommodation and higher value employment opportunities.

If the market will not then provide buildings of suitable quality on a speculative basis, as the costs of doing so exceed a guaranteed return, there is a form of market failure. We could address, in passing, the cherished myth that the private sector is significantly less risk averse than the public sector here. The underlying rationale of intervention is that there must necessarily be some sort of support, usually in the form of direct or indirect financial subsidy, provided by the public sector to underwrite such risk. Alternatively there are the variants of public/private partnerships, wherein the risk is shared and/ or borne largely by the former, or the public sector must make ensure the provision directly through its agencies with the concomitant risks.

This then leads back to the issue of who makes such provision in Wales where, in the past, so-called ‘regeneration’ was predicated on financial intervention in such markets and implemented by bodies like the Welsh Development Agency. Many in regional government remain adamant that the dissolution of that agency was necessary but, in this context, that question may be revisited. One can argue, with the benefit of hindsight, that the participation of the WDA in property markets evolved over time and had moved to that question of quality. Originally it had been largely reactive and a response to the rapid decline in extractive and heavy industry. That was referred to colloquially as the ‘Red Shed Program’ and, in crude terms, meant the bulldozing flat of redundant collieries or other plant and the creation of ubiquitous cul-de-sacs of light industrial units. One problem with these was that such provision proved a deterrent to private sector investment as commercial developers saw the public sector as providing such accommodation at subsidised rental levels. The disposal of those estates to the private sector was in many respects then beneficial in establishing a ‘true’ market, although that was probably not an intentional objective of the then Secretary of State who ordered that sale.

The subsequent campaign of attracting inward investment was also be seen as having been facilitated in part by low unit costs of land and buildings provided by such agencies. That proved to be a relatively short term advantage as lower labour and other costs elsewhere in the world significantly undercut any benefit afforded by cheap accommodation provided in Wales. As major investment declined critics of the WDA questioned the wisdom of ‘renting jobs from the Japanese’ and advocated support for indigenous SME’s and investment in The Knowledge Economy. The response to the latter was the building of ‘Technium’ buildings in proximity to Universities or areas where growth might be encouraged in specialised fields. Initially hailed as a visionary initiative this proved to be unsuccessful commercially and, for some observers, the final nail in coffin that had been constructed for the WDA by its critics in the Assembly. For those, all of the foregoing programs had been predicated on the philosophy of ‘build it and they’ll come’. Those who held the view that the job of government is to increase demand and not tinker with supply were in the ascendant.

A more enlightened view may be that it is not one or the other and that you have to do both to increase the chances of success. Moreover you have to take a much longer term view than may be taken by either commercial developers or elected politicians. In the case of the first, the property development industry in Britain has been dominated by the ‘hit and run’ style of operation since the 1960’s. The prevailing modus operandi in the commercial sector is to build, let and sell as quickly as possible. In the residential house building sector it is simply to build and sell quickly. Both sectors are conscious of the need for speed to avoid the recessionary cycles which have marked property markets, particularly since 1973. In the public sector the short-term view may be attributed to the electoral cycle, which seldom matches the aforementioned recessionary cycle in property markets,and the demand for politicians to produce ‘outputs’ which can be whipped out and waggled in the face of the electorate come polling day. That might be dismissed as a crude and cynical assessment but a cursory analysis of the rhetoric, which is further simplified and amplified by regional media, will evidence the pre-eminence of quantitative claims – numbers of jobs particularly – which are the currency of political claims.

There therefore needs to be a counterpoint to this where the argument for a long term strategy is formulated and properly explained to the electorate as has been the case in Scotland and elsewhere. If intervention is necessary in land and property markets then this should be supported by detailed research and a consensus secured across all parties to ensure that such policy as is necessary can be implemented across much longer property development cycles, let alone the political election cycle. If such policy were to be implemented by the civil service of the Assembly then that section of it responsible needs to be clearly identifiable and fully accountable. At risk of again returning to old issues, the abolition of Quango’s on the grounds that they represented a ‘democratic deficit’ can be questioned in the light of recent property market intervention where no-one can be clear who did what and why.

Some greater maturity would also be desirable in the debate that might inform such policy. All too often in Wales we subside into the sophistry of what may be termed ‘emotional economics’ for want of a better expression. That is the expression by the opponents of investment in contentious development in terms of schools, hospitals, or other essential public services which require accommodation of improved quality. All are necessary and finite economic resources need to be allocated rationally. The priorities need to be clearly established through intellectual analysis and reasoned argument and not the weary and tiresome rhetoric that passes for such in political exchanges.

As mentioned above Scotland has a clearly expressed the economic rationale for government intervention and we need to raise the level of debate and clearly address the issues which are not dissimilar here. Such policy then addresses the disparities that arise from market failure and what may be an essential role for government intervention to deal with related problems. This informs and underpins regeneration strategies which in turn have a strong equity rationale.

“Therefore, both efficiency and equity considerations can justify regeneration projects involving components such as land renewal, commercial, industrial, retail and housing development, improvements in transport and accessibility, environmental improvement,support for business, training and community development. If regeneration policy is effective in identifying relevant market failures, and is well-targeted at addressing equity issues, then it will maximise the possibility of convergence between wealthier and poorer regions, resulting in significant improvements in social cohesion, and potentially boosting long-run economic growth as well.”

(COMMUNITIES ANALYTICAL SERVICES, SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT)

A key phrase in that quotation is, again, ‘long-run’ and the longer term view that is critical in dealing with the property market. In that respect the Welsh Assembly might also revisit the principles of stewardship and better understand how those might have better informed their policy objectives on sustainability. Were they so minded they would also note that housing is included in the Scottish strategy and consider what is, perhaps,an even stronger case for intervention in residential land markets. This would address both the provision of affordable housing and the development of better quality planned settlements across Wales. They need, of course, look no further than the principles upon which the Land Authority for Wales was founded, which was to harvest the uplift in value which inevitably follows planning consent for more valuable use and re-invest that in public projects for wider social benefit. Ultimately that objective was perverted and LAW was denigrated as ‘the Quango that made money’. There is an opportunity to learn from and not repeat the mistakes of the past. In some instances land acquired by that public body was sold at enhanced values and funded major public infrastructure but the related private sector development was of questionable quality. There are numerous exemplars of radical intervention in Europe and elsewhere which would inform and extend such analysis of the benefits that can flow from such policy.

This might be a more enlightened and forward thinking approach than the seemingly spontaneous acquisition of second-hand airports in the wrong location. Such actions merely confirm the view of critics that market intervention is, at best, a very blunt instrument. My conclusion would be that such intervention is but one of the tools in the box and, given the innate imperfections in the property market, may not be refined and deployed as a precision instrument. It can, however, be used with greater skill and, handled with care, intelligence and skill, support and advance wider policy objectives.