RULING FROM A RENTED HOUSE

The tenth anniversary of the opening of The Senedd building of the National Assembly for Wales will be marked on St David’s Day, 1 March 2016. The building may be presented as the product of architectural patronage and representative of the collective aspiration of the people at that time. Any such claim is contested in a draft paper available on the Academia.com website. 

https://www.academia.edu/21105408/Ruling_From_a_Rented_House

That is a case study  of the process of housing the newly devolved regional government of Wales from 1997 to 2006. It examines the proposition that the location of the National Assembly and subsequent commissioning of a new debating chamber designed by the Richard Rogers Partnership was the consequential outcome of a series of events rather than the intentional creation of a building which might symbolise a new form of regional democracy. 

The events under examination may be summarised as follows;

·        At the outset there was an attempt to minimise the anticipated costs of housing the Assembly and a dispute arose on the value of the assumed location, Cardiff City Hall.

·        A wider bidding process then ensued between rival locations within and outside the capital which may be seen to have been divisive.

·        The final decision was made between a location at The Pierhead, Cardiff or Bute Square, Cardiff, the final choice favouring the former. In either case the seat of regional government would be part of a commercial property development.

·        A competition was then mounted to select an architect for the debating chamber, The Senedd, which would be built at the The Pierhead.

·        During its procurement and construction concern over mounting costs resulted in the dismissal and alienation of the architect.

·        In the course of events there were several changes of leadership and little continuity or personal commitment to the new building.

·        In the ensuing political and public debate concerning the building some politicians adopted the language of architectural patronage to defend and rationalise decisions.

A conspicuous failure was in the implementation of the project and the failure of provincial civil servants and their advisers to properly understand and appreciate the aspirational elements that were being articulated by the architects. Independent adjudication concluded that advisers to the Welsh Office were substantially at fault in the dispute that arose with the Rogers Partnership.


The paper offers some observations on the true cost of housing the Assembly. 

A report published in March 2008 by the Wales Audit Office stated that the cost of the Senedd increased from £12M in 1997 to £69.6M in 2006. That was an increase of 580% compared with the original budget forecast in April 1997 (phase 1) and was four years and 10 months late. 

The conclusions of the Audit Office may be considered generous in some respects.

It will be noted that in the course of events the figure originally stated in the 1997 White Paper as the indicative cost of ‘setting up’ the Assembly was £12m-£17m

The lower figure of £12m formed the basis for bids to house the Assembly.                                                        

The following figures may more accurately reflect the actual cost

Capitalised rental of Crickhowell House                    

£1.5m pa                                                                               £25m

(Note ‘market value’ of capitalised rent circa £40m to investor – see below)

Concession of 200 car parking spaces                                       £0.688m

Initial costs of alteration to accommodate Assembly              £14.8m (to2000)

Expenditure on Pierhead Building                                 £3m??

Construction of TheSenedd                                                            £69.6m

                                                                                Total Circa           £112m+                                 £112m+

This can then be expressed as;

·         936% over the original budget of £12m or

·         658% over the upper limit set for Cardiff City Hall at £17m

The foregoing may then be seen to more accurately reflect the costs of ‘setting up’ the regional government.

Since that‘setting up’ the Welsh Government has also established new sub-regional offices in Merthyr Tydfil, Llandudno Junction, Carmarthen and Abersystwyth. The total cost was in the region of £91.5m which included Llandudno Junction (6,500 m2) at £22m and Aberystwyth at £21m[i].

Coupled with the capital cost of the ‘decentralisation’ of the Welsh Government administration were financial incentives for staff required to move if their posts were relocated. Relocation packages for staff moving to the Merthyr Tydfil office cost £2.9m alone - £2.1m of which was for excess travel fares. It was reported that "there was so much resistance from staff due to move from their Cardiff offices to Merthyr Tydfil", excess fares were subsidised for five years instead of the standard three[ii].

The overall value for money from the programme was "uncertain", according to a report by the Auditor General for Wales on the Assembly relocation strategy of 25 March 2014[iii]

A conclusion of that report was that:

“The Location Strategy had clear objectives, but the Welsh Government did not establish effective governance arrangements until 2008 and underestimated the cost of the Programme”[iv]

Finally some overall comment is made on ownership. In March 2014 it was announced that Ty Hywel (formerly Crickhowell House)had been acquired by a family of private investors based in Kuwait for £40.5m from the owners, Aprirose[i]

We have then a situation where the Senedd building, which it was claimed would, in its symbolic form, represent the open, modern democracy of Wales, is inextricably joined to a rented building. This then presents an interesting variation on David Harvey’s observations on collective symbolic capital and monopoly rents(Harvey 2012 pps 103-109).

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[i]http://www.walesonline.co.uk/business/business-news/national-assembly-wales-office-acquired-6770330

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[i]http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/empty-rooms-new-welsh-government-1798510

[ii]http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-26721637

[iii]http://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/north-wales-news/llandudno-junction-915m-welsh-government-6875070

[iv]https://www.audit.wales/system/files/publications/WAO_Welsh_Government_Location_Strategy_Report_English_2014.pdf

Harvey, D. 2012. Rebel Cities. London: Verso.

 

50/50 VISION of a HALF AND HALF CAPITAL

The Towns of Wales by Harold Carter, 1965, University of Wales Press
Cardiff: Half and Half a Capital by Rhodri Morgan. 1994, Gwasg Gomer

In 1965 Harold Carter made some prescient observations on the role of Cardiff as the capital of Wales in the final pages of The Towns of Wales.  It was then only ten years since Cardiff had been so designated and Carter suggested that there were two major sources from which a national capital should derive its importance;

·        Its primary practical function as the centre of government and administration and

·        Its symbolic function of creating and maintaining national unity as the focus of national sentiment

In the fifty years since Harold Carter made that observation Cardiff has consolidated its position as the largest urban and commercial centre in Wales and withstood challenges as to its legitimacy as a regional capital on both counts.

In the transition from the colonial governance of the Welsh Office to the form of devolution narrowly secured in the referendum of 1997 this was of course a close run thing. The failure to reach agreement on the use of Cardiff City Hall as home for the National Assembly re-opened the debate as to whether it should be the centre of government. The arguments for and against this were rehearsed by Carter in 1965 who concluded that the designation of a capital city in a modern state would inevitably generate conflict between the effectiveness as centre of government and as a symbol of nationhood. He noted that another problem particular to Wales was the nature of its urban culture or, more correctly, the absence of it. 

The first proposition that he put to support this was that Wales, as a nation, had not grown from a single nuclear area which was widely recognised as a capital. The desire for a ‘capital’ was then (in the 1950’s) largely a practical or administrative consideration with some recognition or concession that if Wales was a ‘nation’ it should have a capital.

Carter’s second proposition concerned what was then a lack of independent political existence and, to some extent, remains valid. The question is to what extent political power must be devolved for Wales to be considered an independent sovereign state. As matters stand, the designation of Cardiff as a ‘capital’ in the political sense appears to remain one of administrative convenience, albeit one which now has its own civil service. It is the centre of a regional tier of government within the sovereign state of Britain. Carter’s conclusion that any real claim to be the political capital was questionable can then only be contested as to the degree of autonomy currently enjoyed.

The third proposition put by Carter raises deeper rooted questions in suggesting that the indigenous culture of Wales was essentially non-urban and that towns have tended to be the centres of English speech and attitudes. There is then an inherent problem that urban centres cannot be symbolic of a non-urban culture. There is that strain of nationalist sentiment that romanticises an often imagined past and commends virtues associated with a society and way of living of which there is little left outside heritage compounds. Carter notes that this volkisch sentiment may coalesce with the residue of C19th nonconformity and be represented as ‘a Welsh way of life’ and “However real and valuable this may be, it certainly is not epitomised by modern urban society (p355)”.

On the matter of nonconformity and its influence on Welsh life a point may be noted in passing on the development of Cardiff from the mid C19th. The 2nd Marquess of Bute was an autocratic high church Tory but his tolerance of other religions was evidenced by mosques, synagogues, catholic churches and other places of worship that were built on his lands in and around Cardiff. What are very hard to find on any of the former Bute estates in Cardiff are nonconformist chapels. This probably reflected the establishment view of the 2^nd Marquess and his ilk that chapels were where radical politics were fermented and disseminated.

The relevance of this passing point is that the nonconformist chapel can be said to be one of the defining features of the Welsh cultural landscape. That is to say that chapel buildings define both the urban and rural view elsewhere but, due to Bute estate policy, did not and do not define the urban landscape of Cardiff. Those chapels that do exist appear in the main to have been built on areas of land not controlled by Bute. Over the larger area the dominant religious buildings were churches aplenty – Anglican/ Church in Wales or Methodist but most distinctly churches not chapels. In this respect Cardiff did not LOOK like other Victorian settlements in Wales.

Returning to Carter’s propositions he stated in conclusion that, in terms of national pride, the title of capital must inevitably be awarded to a settlement of some size which might reasonably fulfil the functions which it inherits. In the 1950’s the conflicting and irreconcilable desires thus gathered around the determination to give the nation a capital. Cardiff – the head of the economic hierarchy- was the obvious answer, yet it meant accepting an urban symbol of non-urban culture, an anglicised capital of the Welsh nation. It also housed several national institutions including the National Museum and the University of Wales giving it some more general cultural legitimacy. Perhaps, however, the most obvious symbol of national sentiment was Cardiff Arms Park at that time. To most people this is now a given but should be noted that in 1955 even that had not been the ‘national’ stadium.

“The year before capital status was granted, resentment of the city had grown amongst rugby supporters in the west after the Welsh Rugby Union decided to hold all future international matches in Cardiff because the facilities and profits were better there. This may not have been universally popular but it did at least give Cardiff some relevance in the wider Welsh community. In the absence of the traditional apparatus of a nation state, sport played an integral role in developing and sustaining a popular sense of Welsh national identity.”(Johnes,M.  Making of Cardiff, 2012)

This was reiterated by Rhodri Morgan in his 1994 book, Cardiff: Half-and-half a Capital (p17). 

Cardiff Arms Park’s position as the ‘national’ rugby stadium was consolidated through further works ahead of the 1958 British Empire and Commonwealth Games which brought the overall capacity of the stadium to 60,000. The rebuilding of Cardiff Arms Park into a modern National Stadium in the 1970s coupled with the success of the national rugby team gradually made the city a more genuine focus for Wales and Welsh pride. That was a factor, albeit coupled with the economic rationale that underpinned the City Council’s support for its reconstruction as the Millennium Stadium when the Welsh Rugby Union considered building a new stadium at Island Farm in Bridgend ahead of its bid to host the 1999 Rugby World Cup.

Antipathy to the city has, however, persisted and remains an underlying factor fifty years after Carter made his observations. It informs the discussions relating to the recognition of the city region which is, again, largely a matter of political distinction. In the social, cultural and economic landscape city regions have been a given throughout history as is the centrepital force exerted by major settlements referred to in earlier blogs. What Carter highlighted in his 1965 work was that the two periods of significant urbanisation in Wales were;

·        Imposed during the Norman/ Angevin occupation and,

·        Exploitative in the course of industrialisation.

Given that Cardiff is also centred on the pre-urban nuclei of Roman fortification and the Victorian port was built by the Irish for a Scot some consideration might be given to that theory that it must inevitably be viewed as an alien settlement in Wales. It was, and remains, one of the least Welsh place in Wales.  On the other hand Carter's notion that an antipathy to urbanism is embedded in the DNA of the Welsh may be considered fanciful. It may well be in there somewhere and, indeed, have much to do with the terrain of Wales, the inherent challenges that this presented to communication historically and the concomitant parochialism of its scattered communities. In recent years the capital has been the object of envy and resentment not pride among many in its hinterland. This may have much more to do with recent political relationships and perceptions of economic disparity between the city and other parts of Wales.  

It is worth then revisiting Rhodri Morgan's 1994 piece which raised many supplementary questions almost thirty years after Carter's observations. It closes with comment on forms of political autonomy for Wales which preceded the devolution referendum by some 3 years and Rhodri's ascent to the status of First Minster of Wales by three more. The questions it raises appear to remain relevant even now, not least the question raised above as to the degree of 'indpendence' that has been achieved to date and whether that has consolidated or supplemented the status of Cardiff as a 'capital'. As Rhodri Morgan notes in the closing page;

"Perhaps it is easier to assert the right to a share of political control if you do not feel in the beggars can't be choosers position" (p82)

It might be said that Wales remains, over fifteen years after devolution, the beggar at the back door of a bankrupt kingdom. Economically it is not independent but is in fact saturated with a dependency culture. 

Furthermore the devolution process itself emphasised or even exaggerated the 'half-and-half' aspect of the country, let alone Cardiff's status as its capital;

 “…….an unfortunate fault line between the city and the National Assembly- a relationship whose dysfunctional side has been symbolic of Cardiff’s relationship with Wales itself. You can, according to taste, blame this dysfunctionality on inescapable institutional rivalry or on personalities, on Assembly Ministers or on the adversarial approach of the city’s leader, Russell Goodway, in the Assembly’s early years. That the relationship has been a little fractious should not surprise anyone as there is always tension between city governments and the tier above.” (Talfan- Davies, At Arms Length, 2008, p285)

Harold Carter’s 1965 study was a hugely important contribution to understanding the spatial structure and character of human settlement in Wales through a detailed examination of the patterns of its component parts and the process of its development. However, in revisiting his observations on Cardiff one must also consider the sources and instruments of power deployed in the subsequent re-shaping of the south of the city Cardiff and its evolution as a ‘capital’. Revisiting Carter’s work is a reminder that urban morphology must necessarily be supplemented by consideration of institutional structures and how settlements have, historically, been shaped by those who command the necessary resources. The 50th anniversary of its publication should be officially marked and more widely celebrated by the architecture  and planning professions in Wales 

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THE FUTURE OF THE VALLEYS

The BBC Wales documentary on the future of the South Wales Valleys broadcast on 16 March 2015* may be justified as provoking debate but what is desperately needed is intelligent and rational discussion of the issues. Engineering yet another confrontational exchange may be the default setting for those making cheap television but will do little to address the deep rooted social and economic problems of this or other parts of Wales. All too often any meaningful progress has been retarded by this approach in which reasoning turns quickly to rhetoric.

The documentary did little to properly explore the issues that were raised by Jonathan Adams in his IWA paper entitled A Catalyst for Reshaping the Valley Towns. The key point is in the word ‘reshaping’ and the prevailing tone of the trailers and the programme implied some vague proposal for a latter day Highland Clearance. The suggestion originally made by Jonathan Adams was neither ‘radical’ or ‘controversial’ as claimed by the narrator of the documentary and can in fact be seen  to be a simple reiteration of observations made in the South Wales Outline Plan of 1949;

 “ One of the major tasks facing the present generation is to devise means for rejuvenating the (mining) valleys…. The environment of those who live and work in these valleys must be radically improved……. The dual objective of physical planning in these (mining) areas must be to so ameliorate present conditions that industry can function more efficiently, and that those living there and dependent on it can do so in surroundings, and as part of a social structure, comparable with the best standards of modern neighbourhood planning”(South Wales Outline Plan 1949, p19)

The 1949 plan also suggested that the clearance and ‘thinning out’ of outworn dwellings was part of this process of renovation together with better communications, schools and community centres and recreation facilities. An underlying point is that the settlements in that particular area were dysfunctional from the time they were built. The 1949 plan recognised that the impact of coal mining on forms of urban development  was the rapid unplanned construction of “dwellings anywhere and anyhow” and an “untidy sprawl of towns and villages”. In short the settlements were produced by an inherently toxic combination of economic imperative and challenging topography. The proposals by Jonathan Adams are then more optimistic than the view of the great urban geographer Harold Carter in The Towns of Wales in 1965:

“The general character of these towns is, unfortunately, only too well known, and modern planning can do but little to improve it”

It is not then a novel debate nor did the documentary make any new observations. Those settlements that were the focus of the programme were largely the product of coal mining, an industry which grew from the 1850’s in that area, peaked in 1913 and progressively declined until   1989. In short it is 25 years since it’s been gone and 40 years since Max Boyce recorded Rhondda Grey and the issues are still not being discussed rationally.

The relationship between the Valleys and Cardiff was again raised as a contentious issue although that should be recognised as being symbiotic since BEFORE the industrialisation of South Wales. Cardiff relied upon its hinterland when its principal export was butter. Industrialisation must be seen to have been entirely dependent upon transport infrastructure for only with the construction of railways and connection to docks at Cardiff would the mining industry and ports grow from the 1840’s.  Communications remain central to the overall prosperity of the region and this has, again, been a standing issue since the South Wales Outline Plan of 1947;

 “As to regional communications, drastic improvements are called for ……. Though geographical circumstances in South Wales, and particularly in the mining valleys, often cause difficulties in attaining that end” (P10)

The documentary also did a disservice to the counter arguments for the Valleys.  Clearly there has been a need to address the catastrophic decline in the mining and other industries of South Wales.  As was pointed out in the course of the programme interventions in the form of factory building to create and diversify employment have been undertaken since the 1930’s when unemployment in the Valleys was around 40%. Interestingly the first major initiative, even then, involved the establishment of the Treforest Trading Estate on 272 acres of land closer to the coastal belt. The Distribution of Industries Act 1945 granted extensive powers to the Board of Trade for;

·        Building factories in the old ‘Distressed Areas’ and providing finance for industrial estates.

·        The provision for grants or loans to be made available to industrialists willing to establish factories in in these areas and

·        Financial aid for improvement of basic services and clearance of derelict sites

From the 1970’s there were the land reclamation programmes, industrial estates and other major interventions of the Welsh Development Agency. These so-called ‘regeneration’ initiatives have undoubtedly mitigated the full impact of industrial decline but, overall, GDP figures and other statistics suggest that the Valleys are falling further behind the European average. The area remains consistently at the top of league tables for inequalities of poverty, health and education.  Since devolution over £1.2bn of European aid has been spent in the Valleys and West Wales and nearly £300m on flagship Communities First projects to reduce poverty and empower the poorest areas in Wales. As to the latter the Welsh Assembly's Public Accounts Committee suggest that such initiatives have failed and the conclusion must be that small community based projects, as worthy and well intentioned as they are, will not in themselves reverse the damaging legacy of massive industrial decline.  

A forty minute television programme is not going produce a solution to the problems of the Valleys. From the outset the people who live there had to confront adversity from the nature of the predominant form of employment itself, mining, and the nature of the people who employed them. That history of struggle might even be said to inform the tenor of the argument put on their behalf in that television programme which was one of aggressive sentimentality. It most certainly colours their response to proposals emerging from Cardiff, London or Brussels and therein lays another problem. City regions have been a given through the course of human settlement and the vocal denial of this fact by those who claim to represent valley communities has retarded initiatives which might benefit the region and there is every sign that they will continue to do so. The deep seated parochialism of the Valleys communities can be represented as local pride and independence but there will come a time when the world will decide it can move on without them. 

    

The people of Wales and many elsewhere fully recognise that there is a unique history and character in the South Wales valleys and acknowledge that it has contributed significantly to a distinct regional identity. However, it may well be the case that more negative perceptions will be formed by the repeated claims that their lifestyle choice to remain there must be perpetuated by permanent subsidy of others in wider society. That was the impression given by those opposing Jonathan Adams proposition and a much more positive and constructive approach and tone may be needed to avoid further alienation of the Valleys from other communities in Wales. My first job was in Cardiff Docks and there was a tacit understanding that I would be obliged to go there i.e. they weren't going to bring the boats around to Skewen to save me the bother. 

*http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b05gndqz/how-green-is-my-valley-a-future-for-the-valleys

SOCIALLY COMMITTED (not Socialist) - David Mackay and Cardiff Bay

“Architects have given up too easily their role in the architecture of cities, of the public space. It has been left to planning ... Most public space is addressed by engineers, trying to get a car somewhere as quickly as possible.” David Mackay 1913-2014

A tip of the hat and a fond farewell to David Mackay, who died last week. Mackay was a partner in the Barcelona architecture practice MBM (Martorell, Bohigas & Mackay) and had what proved to be as short and frustrating a connection with Cardiff as Zaha Hadid. Through his design of the athletes’ village and harbour for Barcelona’s 1992 Olympic Games, and elsewhere, he gained an enviable international reputation for repairing and shaping cities. He was commissioned by the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation to design the square and avenue that would physically and symbolically re-unite the city centre with its waterfront. His vision was never realised but the misappropriation, dilution and perversion of his master-plan took place over a period of time and did not attract the same degree of attention as the spectacular collapse of Zaha Hadid’s Cardiff Bay Opera House.

It is worth then considering David Mackay’s involvement with Barcelona which started in the 1960s and, as recorded in the Guardian obituary of 23 November “….he took a stand against the neglect and speculation that ravaged the city under the Franco dictatorship. It blossomed in the 1980s, when the Socialist party that ran the city council responded to pressure from below to create more public space and convert post-industrial wastelands to housing and social use.” [i] 

It may then be remarked that Mackay’s principles can be compared and contrasted with those who failed to implement the aspirational vision for what became Callaghan Square and Lloyd George Avenue in Cardiff.

Mackay moved to Barcelona in the 1950’s with his Catalan wife and in 1959 he started working with Josep Martorell and Oriol Bohigas, becoming a partner of MBM in 1962. The two older architects were committed to the re-introduction of rationalist, social architecture to Catalonia and opposed, on social and ethical grounds, the uncontrolled speculative building boom of the 1960s that destroyed much of Barcelona. Their emphasis was on the social role of architecture, its integration and relevance to the urban environment and public space. Theirs was not a mission to leave individualistic monuments to their architectural talents but a careful and considerate response to the social requirements of each commission. They operated in that space between town planning and architecture which we may call urban design. Their belief was that modern architecture could contribute creatively to the identity of a city, enhance its cultural landscape.

Mackay and his partners also sought to achieve mixed-use of activity that ensured that people could work, live and play in districts and bring life to its streets and squares through the whole day. In the event this was not achieved in the Olympic Village at Barcelona, where it was originally intended that affordable housing would be offered after the Games. It was perhaps a victim of its own success, market forces and lack of resolve on the part of the Socialist city government resulting in it becoming an up-market residential ghetto. With the exception of the marina area, few businesses occupy space at street level and away from the coastal frontage it can appear dead and dreary. This will of course sound very familiar in the context of Cardiff Bay. It must be stressed, however, that in Barcelona the original design concept was realised and it was the end use that was betrayed in the failure to properly implement stated social objectives. In Cardiff the kudos – or Cultural Capital- represented by MBM and the Barcelona development was acquired and is perceived by some to have been cynically used in the marketing and promotion of an urban redevelopment that did not have the resources for it to be fully implemented. A visionary project was promised which was originally intended to replace the railway embankment with a broad tree lined boulevard and an integrated tram system.

The importation of internationally recognised design talent to master plan this and other projects was central to a strategy intended to establish Cardiff's place among regional capitals and assure its recognition as a centre of excellence in the reclamation and revival of post-industrial waterfront cities. The stated objective at the time was for a 'ceremonial avenue' and references made to 'Cardiff's Champs Elysees'. In short, not a mere piece of road infrastructure but a PLACE, a civic space with a distinct character and identity. 

By association the rhetoric and marketing alluded to Barcelona and the virtues of a thoroughfare and public space which would be, in itself, an object of universal admiration. 

As to how realistic this was, in principle and practice, needs to be considered. Looking, for example, at the promise of ‘our very own Ramblas’ it is questionable whether this was a tenable proposition from the outset. The Ramblas has 1.6m people at one end and the Mediterranean at the other. That population is concentrated in an area 100km2, an urban population density of 16,000 km2. That may be compared to the density of Cardiff which, even now, is only 5,900km2, the city having fewer than 350,000 souls in an urban area 75.72 km2. Given the advantages of climate and the relative lack of private gardens it is perhaps unsurprising that the inhabitants of Barcelona are more inclined than those of Cardiff to take their recreation in public space. That said the frontage to Cardiff Bay will now, on a sunny day, evidence many strollers but, it may be said, simply not enough of them inclined to populate a 1km avenue.

It may also be added that it is the claims made upon it that might have been contested rather than the aspiration. Ambitious it certainly was but the promoters of the project should perhaps be commended for that. Precious little vision and ambition has been displayed in urban matters by those who constrained the budget then terminated the life of the Development Corporation before such works were completed. The political context in which Mackay was working in both Barcelona and Cardiff may be loosely described as ‘socialist’ and their civic leaders publicly committed to urban renewal. There, however, the resemblance may abruptly end. The internal priorities and external pressures on CBDC may be attributed to politics which were more Byzantine than Barcelonan. The Development Corporation itself may be considered the bastard offspring of an unholy coupling of One Nation Conservatives and oligarchic Labour Party leaders. In any consideration of the redevelopment of South Cardiff at the end of the 20^th century the Cardiff Bay Barrage will always be the White Elephant in the room. That project focussed opposition to the Development Corporation from politicians within and without Cardiff. It created divisions of those who claimed to be of a ‘socialist’ persuasion, some of whom formed curious alliances with those of other faiths. That said, the barrage perhaps merely served to focus the antipathy of Valleys Labour towards the perceived disproportionate investment in Cardiff, Old Labour towards Quango’s and New Labour towards Old Labour. Most of the foregoing were challenged by an emergent cadre of aspirant career Labour politicians who didn’t leave school before the age of 25 and who formed a loose alliance with The Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Such alliances then shifted further at the end of the Millennium and those lucky enough to have drawn a winning ticket in the Assembly Election Lottery had to translate their vocal opposition to CBDC and all its works into responsible governance. And failed.

In practical terms the barrage drained the administrative and financial resources of CBDC and diverted them away from the strategic (physically and symbolically) objectives of re-uniting the city centre with the waterfront. In the final assessment what was eventually produced bore little or no resemblance to the designs produced by David Mackay. The concise appraisal is offered by Geraint Talfan Davies;

“…the sad, misplaced suburbanism of Cardiff’s Lloyd George Avenue; the linked Callaghan Square that could have been a treasured public space but is, in fact, a rectangular, furnished roundabout. All of these have occasioned deep and obvious disappointment among citizens.” (Talfan Davies 2008 p289).

Coupled with that is the continued physical separation of the community to the west by the railway embankment and the failure to deliver the levels of social integration advocated by MBM in their work elsewhere. Talfan Davies goes on to comment that these places are the antithesis of urban design, a process which assumes the purpose and intent implicit in the original appointment of David Mackay. The objectives of reshaping the city for the better were compromised by many factors and culminated in the implementation of infrastructure works through a private finance initiative. Inevitably the procurement of public works by such means places priority on the lowest bid not the achievement of the superlative design standards that were central to the mission originally stated for CBDC by the Secretary of State. In the course of that process social responsibility is to some degree abrogated and, following the dissolution of the Development Corporation, the City Council permitted the construction of a series of ghettoes in South Cardiff. I was going to refer to that as a ‘free for all’ but it was, of course, not. It was an opportunity for those with the financial means to develop or acquire apartments in gated blocks.

I am not aware of David Mackay making any public condemnation of Cardiff and, if he did, it certainly did not attract to the city the unwelcome attention of the international design community as the Zaha Hadid affair continues to do. Privately he expressed some frustration with the procurement of public works in Britain and, in particular, practices such as private finance initiatives which would invariably mean that the designer would be alienated and lose control over the final quality of projects. That such disappointment was expressed quietly is another measure of the man. Others in his position might have complained more loudly about the responsibility without power of the designer and the betrayal of trust by those who commissioned them. Far better that his association with Cardiff be quietly forgotten and little connection made between his designs for Bute Avenue and Square  and the travesty that now sits in their place in the form of Lloyd George Avenue and Callaghan Square.  

If there is to be a verdict in this piece it is that the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation definitely appointed the right man, but possibly for the wrong reasons. By my reckoning the blame cannot be attributed solely to the Corporation but, as was the case with the Opera House fiasco,  the (dis)credit must be shared more widely. Put bluntly, it takes a lot of people a lot of time and effort to fuck things up as frequently and as badly as we do in Wales. To some extent it is institutionalised, many of the participants outlined above having subsequently been at the epicentre of the concentric circles of self-interest that we call ‘government’ in Wales. It is those, who were critical of CBDC, who may suggest that the Corporation only ever intended to rent from David Mackay his reputation. To simply draw upon and then disburse for their commercial ends the cultural capital represented by that man.  

Mackay’s personal commitment to social justice was attested by his actions in opposition to the Franco dictatorship, assisting activists to contact the foreign press and he was a founder of Amnesty International in Spain. Given the earlier comments about the political context of his abortive work in Cardiff it is perhaps a shame that he didn’t stick around here longer.

Talfan Davies, G. (2008). At Arm's Length. Bridgend, Wales, Seren.

              

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[i] http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/nov/23/david-mackay

CARDIFF COAL EXCHANGE

As a coincidental footnote to the previous blog (Nairn’s Cardiff) a new campaign to save the Cardiff Coal Exchange has been called for by the local MP, Stephen Doughty. In his commentary on Ian Nairn’s 1960’s essay on Cardiff Owen Hathersley noted of Butetown that “ The ‘Victorian commercial core of the utmost probity’ nearby is just left to (literally) rot, without the slightest attempt to connect it to the new centre.” At the heart of this is the Cardiff Coal Exchange the present condition of which is, by any measure, a disgrace. Mr Doughty is to be commended for calling for direct action from civic society. By that I mean those who have even a shred of self-respect as citizens of Cardiff – a city which was suggested to be ‘the best UK city to live in’ only last week[1]. (Which was of course duly translated into ‘one of the best in Europe’ by the reliably partisan local press[2]). 

The initiative may necessarily come from within for it is to those citizens of Cardiff that the value of the Cardiff Coal Exchange, expressed as Symbolic and Cultural Capital, belongs. 

Conservation of the Coal Exchange may not be seen as a priority elsewhere in Wales, and in the South Wales Valleys in particular. There the building may be regarded as a symbol of the exploitation of their communities to the advantage of the agents and middlemen of Cardiff who erected it solely for their personal economic gain. The Coal Exchange was not built by the pantomime villains of socialist folklore, the aristocratic or commercial elite of the day (the mining and shipping magnates), but by the emergent bourgeoisie. The autocratic power of the Second Marquess of Bute became a less decisive influence on the development of Cardiff after his death and during the period of the minority of his successor when the Bute estates were administered by Trustees (Davies 1981). Thereafter greater influence was evidenced by the growth of civic society and, particularly, those who prospered from the Bute investment in the infrastructure of Cardiff Docks – the so-called ‘wharf aristocracy’ or ‘Docksmen’. They themselves were, in their day, very distinct from the ‘Townsmen’ the latter being inclined to the conservative and the ‘Docksmen’, by their nature the speculators, chancers and grifters drawn to the potential fortunes to be made in the heyday of coal shipping (Daunton 1977).

As noted in the previous blog the siting of the Coal Exchange in Mountstuart Square was a consequence of, on the one hand, the failure of the original vision of the Second Marquess of Bute for a planned residential development and, on the other, the runaway success of coal exportation through his docks.  What had been a residential square in the Georgian manner became the centrepiece of that ‘Victorian commercial core of the utmost probity’ referred to by Ian Nairn. That was separated from the city by the remainder of Butetown which, before the original Loudon Square was completed, was falling somewhat short of ‘utmost probity’. “The Merthyr Guardian was describing the Bute Street area as ‘increasingly vile and abominable….keepers of public houses and brothels are gradually obtaining possession of the whole street…. Cardiff is gaining a world-wide reputation as one of the most immoral of seaports’. Nevertheless, even today, with much of Butetown demolished, enough remains of the original concept to provide a striking example of Victorian architecture and town-planning in what has been described as ‘perhaps the most tranquil and evocative commercial centre in Europe.” (Davies 1981 p200)

The availability of an open square was then a matter of circumstance but the building of the Coal Exchange was not promoted by the Third Marquess of Bute. It may be better seen as an opportunistic response of the Bute Estate to market demand as, from the terms of the lease, they were not doing the Docksmen any favours. The ground lease of the Coal Exchange was granted for 99 years in 1883 at a peppercorn for the first three years, £100 p.a. for the following two, £200 in the fifth, £700 for the following four years and thereafter £1,000 p.a. for the duration of the lease (Davies 1981 p196). The cost of construction was reputedly £60,000 so the return to the Bute Estate might be regarded a fully commercial rate for the ground. By the reckoning of Daunton (1977) this would be a significantly better percentage return than that enjoyed on the massive financial investment in constructing the docks and also involve much lower risk. The docks, however, created the demand whereby the Bute Estate could exploit their monopoly position on land in central Cardiff.

What may then be considered in passing are the economic consequences. By the mid 1880’s we can, for example, make some fine distinction between the Third Marquess of Bute and the various companies controlled by the Bute Estate. Whereas the second Marquess had been an autocrat who built and controlled a fledgling organisation his son inherited, via the trustees and the period of his minority, distinct commercial enterprises which had wider corporate responsibilities. These commercial organisations had to service the financial demands of the Third Marquess to fund his many interests -including architectural and other patronage- whilst maintaining the economic viability of the various commercial enterprises. In simple terms one can then sketch out a chain whereby costs incurred by the Third Marquess (gold stars on bedroom ceiling) are funded by increased harbour duties, mineral royalties and ground rents on Coal Exchanges. These in turn are then passed through the middlemen, shippers, colliery owners to the source of production. They in turn cut costs (thinner beams in coal seam ceiling) and, for every extra halfpenny a ton abstracted in Cardiff all those underground in the valleys had to shovel that much harder.

This is of course a simplified – or simplistic- outline of the cause and effect of the commercial self- interest of the ultimate beneficiaries of coal production, many of whom were based in Cardiff and, in particular, those intermediaries that made their money from brokerage. This emergent bourgeoisie had, in the main, little personal connection with Cardiff let alone its hinterland. Simply by looking at the population statistics in that period of exponential growth would establish that most of the residents would be, at best, first generation Cardiffians. In reality the majority of those involved in coal shipping had been attracted to the area solely in pursuit of personal gain. However unenlightened their self-interest it nevertheless produced lasting benefit for the city. The construction of the Coal Exchange was as important a contribution to the infrastructure of the (then) town as the cultural, educational and administrative buildings at Cathays Park and elsewhere. The Coal Exchange firmly established Cardiff’s dominance as the commercial and economic centre of South Wales and, thereby, its supremacy in the urban hierarchy. Although it was supplanted by Barry in the tonnage of coal exported Cardiff remained the centre of the coal trade. And by that time Cardiff had, of course, been designated a city. It may then be argued that, from the outset, the principal beneficiaries of such buildings have been the people of Cardiff.

Theoretically there should not then be the expectation that the salvation of the building be funded by those outside the city. There are those who will, on the foregoing grounds, view the Coal Exchange as simply a monument to Victorian venality and oppose any wider financial contribution to its restoration. Taking such line of reasoning to its (il)logical conclusion we might briefly consider the case of Cardiff Castle which has, over the course, been a symbol of Roman, Norman, Plantagenet and feudal subjugation of the indigenous population and was elaborately and expensively restored largely through their indirect exploitation during the 19^th century[3]. Lesser cases would be Duffryn House and gardens, Insole Court or any other edifices erected on the proceeds of coal mining and shipping. Blaenavon is a World Heritage site, Big Pit is maintained by our National Museum and there is a tollbooth in St Fagans. In fact many of Britain’s most cherished heritage attractions are the legacy of far more oppressive exploitation both here and, more particularly, overseas.

The converse argument is therefore that architecture and landscape is the repository of our collective memory and we simply recognise the past for what it is. Our common heritage. The ascendancy of Cardiff and the other major urban centres through the abstraction and exportation of coal is absolutely central to the story of modern Wales. The Coal Exchange may be seen to symbolise the epicentre of that trade and consequent development. The Victorian Society consider the building one of Wales’ most important landmarks and that society (unsuccessfully) campaigned to save the London Coal Exchange from deliberate demolition rather than neglect. The Cardiff Exchange probably has less importance in terms of architectural history than that.

Architecturally the work of Edwin Seward may be considered better represented elsewhere in the city. Recent works to the Cardiff Royal Infirmary display those buildings to greater advantage and the Old- Old -Old Central Library in the Hayes considered by some his finest building (Newman 2004 p211). (The conversion of the latter to the ill- fated Centre for Visual Arts may perhaps be noted as regards any suggestion as to where the future use of Coal Exchange may lie)  The ‘debased French Renaissance vocabulary’ of the exterior elevations of the Coal Exchange are less remarkable and the architectural value of the building is largely in its lobby and trading hall (Newman 2004). To some extent that argument has already been lost as successive planning consents have permitted significant alterations including the threat of extensive demolition and retention of the facades. It is probable that public access to the lobby and hall would have been very restricted had the Macob consent for conversion of the building to residential use proceeded. It remains, however, a listed building of some architectural importance and more social and historic significance.

However, after all the above is said one has to question whether any cultural heritage case or argument is really the best way forward. We can turn now to the Welsh Government who devote proportionately less resources to a) Cadw than are allocated to the equivalent bodies in other regions of the UK and b) Visit Wales whose marketing in part promotes that heritage. This may be underlined by the recent decision of the Welsh Government leadership that the Cabinet does not need a Culture Minister. In the first instance their attention may best be arrested by suggesting that the current predicament of the Coal Exchange is a direct result of the negligence of their officers. This may be outlined by moving to the more recent history of the Coal Exchange.

The Cardiff Bay Development Corporation  acquired the Coal Exchange in 1988. At that time it was in multiple occupation having been previously acquired by a company called Control Securities who had carried out alterations and ‘improvements’ in anticipation that the building would be the home of a Welsh Assembly following the devolution vote of 1979. The proposal for regional devolution at that time was defeated by a majority of 4:1 (20.3% for and 79.4% against) with only 12% of electorate voting in favour of establishing an assembly. Neil Kinnock was one of six south Wales Labour MPs who campaigned against devolution on centralist, essentially British-nationalist grounds. When the Coal Exchange was owned by CBDC it housed, among others, the offices of Mrs Glenys Kinnock MEP. There was, in fact, a multiplicity of tenants and both this and nearby buildings around Mountstuart Square enjoyed something of a false dawn, particularly during the period of CBDC’s operational lifetime. Animation and design companies, a theatre group in the former St Stephens church, artists studios and a host of other activities which were attracted initially by the relatively low cost space in that area and then by the presence of complementary activity. New bars and restaurants opened and there was a lively music scene with The Dowlais, The Exchange itself and other venues (the fabled Casablanca Club was an early casualty).

CBDC formulated various proposals for the restoration and adaptive re-use of the Coal Exchange. The estimated costs were somewhere north of £10m and commercial companies were invited to tender on the basis that they would undertake that work. In short, such capital expenditure was to be a condition of such sale. Macob were selected having bid something in the region of £800k. At that time the rental income for the hall and various offices and other occupiers in CBDC's time may have been in the region of £400k a year. Subsequently the building was vacated of tenants in anticipation of major development. Following the dissolution of CBDC it would appear that the property was sold by the Welsh Government in 2001 without the condition to spend the £10m + on immediate repairs and refurbishment. The figure reported in the property press at the time was £500k for the 200,000 sq ft building (£2.50 per square foot).

Macob, to their credit, allowed continued use of the hall as a music and function venue and many notable events happened there. I would make it absolutely clear that John Roberts of Macob is a decent and honest man who extended the use of the Coal Exchange Hall as a music venue at some considerable personal expense. However, Macob - then effectively under the control of another individual- subsequently revised the proposals for the building from those originally presented to CBDC to a residential development which would have seen the hall closed as a music venue and reduced to a form of atrium.  On securing consent for that development the building was re-mortgaged at the then market peak and, in the subsequent recession, represented negative equity. The residential development did not proceed. John Roberts resumed personal control of Macob, re-opened the hall for a time and started carrying out some essential repairs and refurbishment on the building. This has been a losing cause in the economic climate of recent years and, as is now the case, has resulted in the company that owns the building going into liquidation.

More recently there was action by Cardiff City Council who invoked legislation which may have led to a coercive acquisition of the building from Macob. That action might have been regarded as an enterprising and entrepreneurial attempt to restore the position that had been achieved by CBDC but proved to be abortive. Alternatively their action may be expressed as a cynical and opportunistic attempt to secure an asset which was bought and paid for by the taxpayer via CBDC and sold, either incompetently or corruptly, by officials of the Welsh Government in 2001. There is therefore a case for formal public investigation into the recent history of the Coal Exchange to determine whether incompetence or corruption of public officials placed it in the hands of Macob. The question that needs to be addressed concerns the terms of the sale to Macob by the Welsh Government. The fault and any blame in this sorry affair would appear to lie squarely with the latter.

If, as is rehearsed above, the Cardiff Coal Exchange is held to be Cardiff’s problem then, at a minimum, some claim may be made by the city on The Welsh Government for financial assistance by way of reparation for the negligence of their officers.

That then deals with the issue as to how the attention of the Welsh Government may be arrested as regards the future of the building. The blame game will not, however, save it. The future of it, and Mountstuart Square was probably at the feet of the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation in that brief renaissance. Rather than be distracted or impeded by the cultural and heritage issues outlined above the future of the Coal Exchange is probably not a Grand Projet but in the fields of entertainment, education and experiment. A community led project which would see the restoration of the building as an extended exercise in building restoration skills led in part by local universities and FE Colleges. Conservation and traditional building skills are desperately needed across Wales and the Coal Exchange could provide hands on experience to students for several years.

For the sake of clarity I will elaborate on this. In my view students of architecture, engineering or other constructions would benefit as much from seven weeks on the trowels as seven years on Autocad. As to the crafts I am not suggesting some Equal Opportunity Community Youth Training Work Experience venture. I would be more inclined to an elite cadre comprising the best four or five students in each of the ‘biblical skills’ selected from the FE Colleges of Cardiff and its neighbouring boroughs. These should be selected on merit and superior ability not proportional representation, allocation, sex, creed, colour or by virtue of being distantly related to the Board Member of a Welsh Institution. The objective would be for them to leave after a year of advanced applied education and be recognised as the leading practitioners of their craft in their generation. Training which is informed by the pursuit of excellence and leads directly to highly skilled jobs.

This will, in turn produce relatively low cost accommodation of some quality which can be occupied across a range of uses.  As Jane Jacobs observed over fifty years ago – ‘new ideas need old buildings’. Obviously this challenges the fixation of our politicians with shiny new buildings on roundabouts but the Welsh Government should have seen the error of that way. Was not the Techniums Fiasco a contributory factor in bringing about the ultimate demise of the Welsh Development Agency? As may be observed from the preceding blog more locally much of what has replaced older buildings is not very good.

The origins of the Coal Exchange and cultural/ heritage baggage of its distant past are then as little if we can posit a future where it is possessed for the common good. That can be guided by the intelligent and inventive thinking that has informed the effective regeneration and adaptive re –use of older buildings elsewhere. Among these are, for example, the Custard Factory, Birmingham and The Melting Pot, Edinburgh. The Coal Exchange offers the advantages of an outstanding venue in the hall and a wider variety of potential use around in the building. This could include low cost foyer style residential accommodation in one wing, studios in another. In its commercial heyday the building had restaurants, a gentleman’s club and a wine merchant in the lower floor. More recently Mountstuart Square has doubled up as a Dalek devastated London. Somewhere between the two is a future for the Coal Exchange.

If you have any thoughts on that Mr Doughty, who represents Cardiff South and Penarth, can be contacted at stephen.doughty.mp@parliament.uk

References

Daunton, M. J. (1977). Coal Metropolis Cardiff 1870-1914. Leicester, Leicester University press.

              

Davies, J. (1981). Cardiff and the Marquesses of Bute. Wales, University of Wales Press.

              

Newman, J. (2004). The Buildings of Wales: Glamorgan. London, Yale University Press.

              

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[1] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29174074

[2] http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/cardiff-voted-one-best-cities-7503586

[3] A future blog will deal with the Pembrokes who preceded the Butes as lords of Cardiff castle.